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Neither Intellectual nor Property
National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
At least in rhetoric, courts have long espoused the ideal that intellectual
property law primarily protects incentives for creation, not remuneration for
creators, and that property-like entitlements in this area of law are
instrumental-not natural-rights.' These affirmations, however, have rung
somewhat hollow, since courts have rarely, if ever, had to make the hard
choice between the incentive and remunerative purposes of intellectual property
law in a particular case.2
National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc. ' presents a rare fact pattern
in which the plaintiff's remuneration and the plaintiff's incentives may be
separately considered, allowing a court to explore the full ramifications of the
incentive logic of intellectual property. The Second Circuit's decision is
significant in two principal ways. First, it substantially narrows the scope of
"hot news" misappropriation 4---one of the last bastions of a Lockean labor
theory of property s and a perennial bete noire of intellectual property incentive
1. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel, Scrv. Co. 499 U S 340. 349 (1991) ("The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors. but '[to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts' (quoting U.S. CONST. an. I. § 8, cl. 8)); United States v Paramount Pictures. Inc. 334 U S
131, 158 (1948) (holding that the author's benefit is clearly a secondary consideration) But cf Dallas
Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.. 604 F 2d 200, 206 (2d Ctr 1979) (holding that the
plaintiff's trademark uniforms were "in the nature of a property right"). Chemical Corp of America v
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that in the context ofi a misappropination
claim the plaintiff had a property right in its advertising slogan) Rather than dwelling on the justilfications
for the incentive rationale of intellectual property, this Case Note will concentrate on some of the often
overlooked ramifications of this logic.
2. The structure of intellectual property doctrnes has led courts to protect the creator's remuneration
as a proxy for directly protecting her incentives. See Twentieth Century Music Corp v Aiken. 422 U S
151, 156 (1975) (noting that although "[tlhe immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an 'author's' creative labor . the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate anistic creativity for
the general public good").
Thus, the standard for infringement in intellectual property cases has tended to be injury to the
plaintiff's market share or other property-like remuneration, without any direct examnmation of the plaintiff's
incentives for creating the work in the first place. See REsTATFiENr (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COiPETITION §
38 cmt. c (1996); see also Harper & Row, Publishers. Inc. v Nation Enters. 471 U S 539. 556-57 (1985)
(holding that in copyright law a finding of market impairment will generally preclude a fair use defense)
3. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
4. See id. at 852.
5. See JOHN LOCKE, Two THEORIES oF GOVERN ,hNT 123-24. 134-40, 143-46 (Thomas I Cook ed.
1947) (1690) (arguing that one who joins one's labor to an object has a property nght in that object as long
as "enough and as good" is left for others); cf Wendy J Gordon. On Onnung Inforniation Intellectual
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theorists.6 Second, it goes further than any previously reported case by
indicating that intellectual property law will not protect a plaintiff's
remuneration if the plaintiff's incentives are not thereby protected.7 Judge
Winter's opinion, without much fanfare, offers a new and promising test for
misappropriation, a test which has the broader effect of refocusing courts'
attention on the goal of intellectual property: the enrichment of the public
domain.
II
In 1996, Motorola began selling "SportsTrax"-a handheld pager that
displays continually updated real-time information about NBA games in
progress. The SportsTrax technology relies upon a data feed from Sports Team
Analysis and Tracking Systems ("STATS") reporters, who watch or listen to
television or radio broadcasts of the games and transmit score changes, the
team in possession, the time remaining, and other information. STATS also
relays this information to an America Online site. The NBA, which is
developing a similar product known as "Gamestats," sued, alleging common
law misappropriation of its rights in the broadcasts, among other claims.'
The district court upheld the misappropriation claim:9 "By disseminating
to fans the changing scores and leads and other information on a real-time
basis, defendants have appropriated the essence of NBA's most valuable
property-the excitement and entertainment of a game in progress."'" The
Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Copyright
Act of 1976" preempted the hot news misappropriation claim.'
2
The doctrine of misappropriation-and its hot news variant-originated in
the classic case International News Service v. Associated Press (INS).13 In
that case, Justice Pitney's opinion-employing an agricultural conceit that has
caught the fancy of numerous courts and commentators-held that "the
defendant in appropriating [this material] and selling it as its own is
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 208-09 (1992) (explaining that the Lockean
logic of property illustrates how a right to remuneration can be derived from a right against harm).
6. See, e.g., Gary Myers, The Restatement's Rejection of the Misappropriation Tort: A Vctory for the
Public Domain, 47 S.C. L. REV. 673, 673 (1996) (stating, in reference to hot news misappropriation, that
"[s]ome legal theories, like the proverbial vampire, refuse to die.")
7. See National Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 853.
8. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071,
1080-81, 1085-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in part, vacated in part by 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
9. See id. at 1106.
10. Id.
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
12. See National Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 853-54.
13. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). INS, a news-gathering service, took AP stories as they were published on
the East Coast and transmitted the news by telegraph and telephone to be sold as INS stories on the West
Coast. See id. at 231. Thus, INS took advantage of the bicoastal time difference to compete with AP, using
AP's own material. The copyright law of the time did not allow for a copyright in news stories, so the
plaintiffs sought redress in the law of unfair competition.
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endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to
newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating to
itself the harvest of those who have sown."'" Characterizing the nature of the
plaintiff's hot news remuneration as "quasi-property,"' 5 the INS Court
established a broad, equitable anti-copying doctrine that has developed into the
law of misappropriation. Although courts and commentators have struggled to
lend definition to the Court's sweeping statement, the tort seems to involve at
least the following: (1) the creation of a product by the plaintiff's expenditure
of time, labor, and skill; (2) the defendant's use of the product in competition
with the plaintiff; and (3) resulting commercial damage to the plaintiff. 6
The precedential value of INS has weakened over time, and fact patterns
calling for application of the doctrine are relatively rare.' 7 Nevertheless,
misappropriation has functioned as a useful space in which courts and
commentators could debate the philosophy and policy of the "pure" common
law of intellectual property, unencumbered by any need to take account of
statutory provisions or congressional intent.
III
Hot news misappropriation is one of the few state law misappropriation
claims that the Copyright Act of 1976 did not preempt.'" The Second
14. Id. at 239-40.
15. Id. at 236. Courts and commentators use the term hot news misappropriation to refer to the
following doctrine derived from the broad language of INS. Although facts are normally in the public
domain, some "hot" facts may be considered to be the quasi-property of their discoverer or creator for a
short period of time. See, e.g., Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Sery., 808 F 2d 204. 209 (2d Cir
1986) ("The 'hot' news doctrine is concerned with the copying and publication of information gathered by
another before he has been able to utilize his competitive edge.") In INS, this quasi-property right lasted
only while the news stayed "hot"--that is, until the plaintiffs were able to disseminate the news nationally.
at which point the news stories reverted to the public domain. See INS, 248 U S at 245-46
16. See Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants. Inc .218 N W 2d 705.709 (Wts 1974).
C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine- Cownuon Lais Protection
for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55. 68 (1987)
17. INS ceased to be strictly binding in 1938 when the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Radroad Co
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), abolished the general federal common law upon which INS was based
State common law misappropriation doctrines sprang up to replace it. see. e g . Metropolitan Opera Ass'n
v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup Ct 1950). aff'd, 107 N YS 2d 795 (App Div
1951) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for misappropriation where the delendant sold phonograph
records of the plaintiff's uncopyrighted broadcast opera performances). olten employing the rhetoric ol
reaping and sowing. In 1964, however, the Supreme Court indicated thai state law doctnnes would be
preempted to the extent that they conltict with federal intellectual property law See Compco Corp v Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co v Stiflel Co. 376 U S 225 (1964)
18. The Act provides that a state law is preempted if (1) the right provided by state law is "equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyrigh"'-the "'general scope requirement", and
(2) the subject matter protected by the state law doctrine is a fixed work of authorship that comes within
the subject matter of federal copyright-the "subject-matter requirement " 17 U S C § 301 (1994)
Although the Copyright Act makes explicit provision for the survival o1 state INS-type claims. see
H.R. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S C C.A.N 5659. 5748 (providing that the Copyright
Act of 1976 should not preempt state law hot news misappropriation claims. since these claims are net
equivalent to copyright infringement), it leaves unresolved the breadth ol this preemption exception
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Circuit's decision, like those of many other courts, 9 concluded that "only a
narrow 'hot-news' misappropriation claim survives preemption for actions
concerning material within the realm of copyright.' 2  Judge Winter's
preemption analysis was fairly standard to the extent that it required a state
misappropriation claim to contain an "extra element" in order to survive
preemption if it was otherwise within the general scope of federal copyright
law.2' The significance of Judge Winter's opinion inheres in his distillation
of the surviving INS claim to the following list of elements:
(i) the plaintiff generates or collects information at some "cost or
expense; (ii) the value of the information is highly time-sensitive; (iii)
the defendant's use of the information constitutes free-riding on the
plaintiff's costly efforts to generate or collect it; (iv) the defendant's
use of the information is in direct competition with a product or
service offered by the plaintiff; [and] (v) the ability of other parties
to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the
incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality
would be substantially threatened.22
At first, this list appears similar to the various definitions of
misappropriation that courts and commentators have proposed over the
23years. What is groundbreaking, however, is the fifth proposed element: the
incentive requirement.' More precisely-since discussion of incentives is
Preemption concerns are especially pertinent to misappropriation claims, which often function as
arguments of last resort. See Myers, supra note 6, at 691. As the boundaries of other areas of intellectual
property law become more clearly delineated, see, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that factual compilations lacking even a modicum of creativity do not qualify for
copyright protection), there is a danger that plaintiffs may use misappropriation as an end run around the
boundaries of federal intellectual property protections.
19. See, e.g., Financial Info., Inc., 808 F.2d at 208-09 (holding that the Copyright Act of 1976
preempts most misappropriation claims but recognizing an exception for hot news misappropriation).
20. National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852 (2d Cir. 1997).
21. See id. at 850. Judge Winter here was following the generally accepted analysis as stated in
Computer Associates International v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). See id. at 716 ("[l1f an 'extra
element' is required ... in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, then the right does not lie
'within the general scope of copyright,' and there is no preemption." (quoting I MELVILLE NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B], at 1-15 (1996))).
22. National Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 852 (citations omitted).
23. See supra text accompanying note 16.
24. The authorities that Judge Winter cites to support this element stop several steps short of an actual
incentive requirement. For example, Financial Information, Inc., which he cites, states that "[tihe 'hot'
news doctrine is concerned with the copying and publication of information gathered by another before he
has been able to utilize his competitive edge" and says nothing about incentives per se. Financial Info.,
Inc., 808 F.2d at 209.
Some authorities have drawn a distinction between primary and secondary markets, concluding that
damage to the plaintiff's interest in a collateral product is not sufficient injury to sustain a misappropriation
claim. See, e.g., United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1038 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that a computer company's use of a golf association's mathematical handicapping
formula did not constitute misappropriation because "it is inconceivable that Data-Max's business will
interfere with the U.S.G.A.'s incentive to maintain or update the handicap formula"); National Football
League v. Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977) ("While courts have recognized that one has
a right to one's own harvest, this proposition has not been construed to preclude others from profiting from
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commonplace in intellectual property law-Judge Winter's groundbreaking
move was to separate the incentive requirement from the fourth element, the
requirement of competition or injury to the plaintiff's commercial interests.
Courts have tended to lump these two requirements together, treating evidence
of damage to the plaintiff's commercial interests as an adequate proxy for
injury to the creator's incentives.' In the average intellectual property
dispute, this logic of proxy is entirely adequate. Cases requiring courts to
distinguish injury to incentives from injury to remuneration are quite rare,
since one rarely encounters a fact pattern in which: (1) the plaintiff and the
defendant are competitors; (2) the defendant's appropriation of the plaintiff's
intellectual property results in damage to the plaintiff's commercial interests;
but (3) the plaintiff's incentives for creating and disseminating the good are not
substantially affected by the defendant's use. '6
In such cases, the intellectual property logic of proxy may lead to
overbroad and automatic protection of private remuneration, resulting in the
unnecessary impoverishment of the public domain. In these cases, courts
should follow the Second Circuit and decline to grant presumptive intellectual
property protections to bare entitlements.
IV
The focus on incentives instead of remuneration in National Basketball
Ass'n gives substance to the rhetoric of intellectual property, in which the
primary objective is not to reward the labor of authors, but -[t]o promote the
demands for collateral services generated by the success of one's business venture ") The National
Basketball Ass'n decision goes further than these precedents. One could conceive of a fact pattern in which
the defendant's use of the plaintiff's product interfered with plaintiff's pnmary market, under National
Basketball Ass'n, the plaintiffs would still have to prove a substantial threat to their incentives in order to
prevail on a misappropriation claim.
25. In addition to the authorities discussed supra note 24. other courts and commentators have treated
the incentive requirement as identical to the requirement of damage to the plaintiff's commercial interests
In INS itself, as Judge Winter notes in his opinion, see National Basketball Ass'n. 105 F3d at 853, the
Supreme Court was concerned with the possibility that INS's actions would erode AP's profits until
newsgathering would no longer be a feasible undertaking. See International News Serv v Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 240-41 (1918).
26. This factual profile arose in the present case because three different products were involved. the
games themselves, the broadcasts of the games, and the factual data gleaned from games in progress See
National Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 853. The product in dtspute---thc factual data-s essentially a by-
product of the first two products. Thus harm to the NBA's commercial interests in the third product is
unlikely to result in substantial injury to the NBA's incentives to produce the three products
This factual profile, although it has been rare until now, is likely to become more common with the
increasing momentum of vertical and horizontal integration, as conglomerates seek to defend their profits
in secondary by-products. Moreover, occasions of appropriation may become more frequent as advances
in technology make it easier for users to appropriate works and products while they are still "hot " After
all, in the not too distant past it would have been unthinkable that information could have been copied and
disseminated in two different media-on a pager network and on a website-within seconds of the original
broadcast. And INS itself can be understood as an equitable response to new technology-telephones and
telegraphs-to which intellectual property doctrine had not had a chance to respond See Myers, 5upra note
6, at 687-88.
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Progress of Science and useful Arts."27 Now that some of the unrealized
implications of this rhetoric have been fleshed out, we can expect complaints
from those who discover that their hold on their supposed intellectual
"property" may be more tenuous than they had assumed.2 s Even though one
can have a rational understanding that property does not arise from labor,2
some perception of injustice may remain in a misappropriation situation.30
It is important to keep in mind that three interests are actually involved in
every intellectual property dispute: those of the plaintiff, those of the
defendant, and those of the public domain. The bipolar structure of intellectual
property litigation sometimes requires that the defendant function as a proxy
for the public interest. Thus the morality of the individual defendant and the
worthiness of the individual plaintiff may not be as relevant as the net
enrichment or impoverishment of the public domain.31 The public's interest
in intellectual property law is often invisible, inhering in the boundaries of
various doctrines and overshadowed by the parties in infringement disputes.
Only by taking account of this hidden interest can we ensure that, under our
constitutional system of intellectual property, "[t]he public good fully
coincides ... with the claims of individuals. 32
-Monica Y Youn
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Justice Holmes's succinct disagreement with the majority in INS is still the best response to
complaints based on the labor theory of property: "Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value,
[which is] a matter of fact." INS, 248 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis echoed this
insight: "[Tihe fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and labor, and has a value for
which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this legal attribute of property." Id. at 250
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. Professor Felix Cohen explained the fallacy of the argument that property arises from one's labor
in creating an object of value: "The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base
legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a [product]
depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected." Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 815 (1935),
30. In misappropriation claims, the defendant's conduct often appears unsavory-"free riding" and
"piracy" are common epithets in intellectual property cases. See, e.g., INS, 248 U.S. at 231 ("The bill was
filed to restrain the pirating of complainant's news by defendant."). The plaintiff, on the other hand, may
appear as the beleaguered creator, in danger of being stripped of her just deserts due to some technicality
in intellectual property law. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 279. In some cases, the defendants are
independent creators themselves, seeking to take advantage of the cultural and informational resources at
hand. See id. at 157. One hesitates, however, to attribute such noble motivations to all intellectual property
defendants.
31. As Judge Winter points out, "INS is not about ethics; it is about the protection of property rights
in time-sensitive information so that the information will be made available to the public by profit seeking
entrepreneurs." National Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 853.
Overprotection of individual interests can substantially harm the public domain by barring would-be
innovators from the materials of which innovations are made. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967) ("[I]f man has any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to imitate
his fellows, and thus to reap where he has not sown. Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of mimicry,
and 'progress,' if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on a generous indulgence of copying.").
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
